


































Abstract - Numerous contributions in the last decades are based on similar inspiratory principles, which, at 
least if considered altogether, are highly innovative with respect to the existing tradition in economics. This 
paper is a perspective and speculative guess aiming at identifying the gist of this ongoing change in 
economics and at promoting its accomplishment. 
First, the features characterizing what I argue is a new approach to economic theorizing - labelled “dynamic 
social economics” - are presented and extensively discussed. Then, given the prominence of some 
mathematical techniques as general tools of analysis for this kind of models, a synthetic survey of the main 
relevant results is provided. 
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Leonardo Boncinelli, Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Università di Siena 1 Introduction
In relatively recent times an increasing number of economists has been writ-
ing works sharing a set of distinctive features. In particular, I would mention
the literature placeable into those research streams known as evolutionary
economics1 - of which evolutionary game theory2 can be thought of as the
main formal expression - social interactions and agent-based modeling. The
main ideas regarding rationality requirements, how reduction is carried out,
the choice of objectives and instruments for economic modeling are distin-
guishing features of this arising way of doing theory with respect to tradi-
tional ones.
However, a precise identiﬁcation of the set of works accomplishing this
renewal is troublesome and not extremely useful. In fact, being this litera-
ture rather heterogeneous, the contribution which is relevant to my analysis
is often aﬀected by inﬂuences coming from distinct traditions. Hence some
inconsistencies and strains among these works exist as a consequence of their
diﬀerent origins. Instead of being interested in ﬁnding out the features which
are shared by some vaguely identiﬁable collection of works, my focus is on
what would be presumably shared once the corrections due to the peculiar-
ities of their backgrounds were applied. My guess is that several streams,
if able to overcome the reticencies due to their origins, are going to merge
in what is likely to be a new paradigm for economic theorizing. To use
a methapor with a dynamic ﬂavor, they are converging towards the same
state in the space of features, but since they started from diﬀerent initial
conditions they are still spaced out. The ﬁrst aim of the paper is to identify
and comment the characteristics of that attracting state.
My prediction of a new paradigm in economics attracting some current
research streams is highly speculative, and I will not try to sustain it through
well-developed historiographic arguments, conﬁning myself to some quota-
tions and references by some of the main authors in the appropriate research
ﬁelds. However, the features which I am going to discuss are, from my point
of view, highly desirable for economic theory. Hence, if one disagrees with
the descriptive nature of my prediction, then my contribution should be
evaluated uniquely on a prescriptive ground.
As an anticipating example of subsequent contents, I would like to recall
Schelling’s dynamic model of residential segregation (Schelling, 1971). In
1Origins for evolutionary economics date back at least to Schumpeter (1934) and even
earlier to Veblen (1898) (somewhat more controversial is the inclusion of Marx among
evolutionary theorists, see Hodgson (1993) for a discussion), hence to times which are not
recent at all. Here I refer to the new wave of evolutionary ideas originating mainly from
the ﬁrm’s maximization debate (Alchian, 1950; Friedman, 1953; Becker, 1962; Nelson and
Winter, 1982).
2It can be worth recalling that evolutionary game theory appeared in a biological
context thanks to the work of Maynard Smith and Price (1973) and Maynard Smith
(1974) who introduced the concept of evolutionarily stable strategy.
1that work the concern was on whether and how segregation can emerge out
of uncoordinated decisions of a collection of agents, individually not aiming
at segregated locations. Schelling analyzed the issue by taking agents from
two populations and randomly placing them on the squares of a checker-
board, with each individual’s neighborhood deﬁned as the eight squares
surrounding her location. Each individual is discontent if the relative pro-
portion of neighbors belonging to her own population falls below a certain
threshold. In each period a discontent agent can move to a free square and
he will, if and only if there is any available which meets her demands to be
content. Schelling carried out his analysis through simulations got through
repeated trials by hand, arriving at the conclusion that with high probability
agents will end up to be almost completely segregated by their population
belonging.
More recently, a slightly modiﬁed version of Schelling’s original model
has been characterized analytically in its asymptotic behavior, rigorously
deriving previous intuitive conclusions (Durlauf and Young, 2001, chap. 5).
Nevertheless, Schelling’s work contained already all - even if somewhat at
a seminal stage - the core elements which I aim at pointing out in this
paper: starting from a micro-structure of agents interacting through non-
market relationships and endowed with limitive cognitive capabilities, the
macro-properties of the resulting aggregate dynamic system are investigated.
Moreover, I would like to stress that the lack of a deductive analysis in
Schelling (1971)3 is counterbalanced by the presence of an inductive rea-
soning grounded on simulation results. This particular method for drawing
conclusions is the peculiar one in agent-based modeling and - I will argue
in the following - it represents an important complementary instrument for
doing theory in economics when mathematical deduction is impracticable.
After discussing the pre-analytical ground on which this approach to
economic theorizing is rooted, the paper presents those mathematical tech-
niques which naturally ﬁt the role of tool for developing this kind of analy-
sis. First, basic elements of Markov chain theory are introduced; then, some
noise is added thus yielding a so-called perturbed Markov chain, whose long-
run behavior converges to a stationary distribution irrespectively of the ini-
tial state. This distribution is, however, diﬃcult to compute and hence it has
become standard to focus instead on the limit of that stationary distribution
for the amount of noise going to zero. Such limiting distribution is called
stochastically stable distribution. The main results for its computation are
provided.
A conclusive comment concerns the label selected for this new way of
doing theory in economics, “dynamic social economics”. The reason of such
a choice is a mixture of minor reasons which I brieﬂy mention. “The New
3Appropriate techniques for dealing with large statistical systems have been developed
after Schelling’s main contributions.
2Social Economics”is the title of an article by Durlauf and Young where many
features of this new approach are outlined; furthermore, that work belongs
to a collection of many interesting papers called“Social Dynamics”(Durlauf
and Young, 2001). Moreover, social interactions is an important research
stream within this approach, but one of the main limitations it suﬀers is the
lack of an extensive dynamic analysis. Therefore, the adjective“dynamic”in
front of“social”remarks this point. I was also tempted to use“evolutionary”
in the label but at the end prevented from, being such a term overloaded by
misleading meanings rooted in its biological origin.4 As it should be clear
after reading the paper, the terms “dynamic” and “social” condense some
important features of this approach. What about the role of“economics”in
the label? Rather than to circumscribe the inquiry ﬁeld - which instead is
enlarged to social phenomena and not restricted to merely economic ones -
its function is to recall the rigor of analysis and the type of categories used
for representation, which are typical of economics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 identiﬁes the pre-
analytical features of dynamic social economics. Section 3 presents the main
analytical techniques employed to draw conclusions. Section 4 summarizes
and brieﬂy comments on the paper.
2 Identifying Features
The founding features of dynamic social economics are listed and explained
in what follows.
Micro-structure. This issue touches a long and unsolved controversy re-
garding the role of reductionism in science and particularly in economics.
By reductionism it is meant the idea that an explanation of a phenomenon
must be given in terms of its elemental, constituent parts. I claim that in
economics there are good reasons to use individuals as units for explana-
4In economics there arise diﬃculties to substantiate in a general way the principles of
selection and inheritance, which are fundamental if some proper reference to how the term
evolution is used in other disciplines is meant to be maintained. In biology there is a rather
general agreement that genes are the units of selection and they are transmissible to one’s
own oﬀspring. In economic environments instead there does not exist a general and mean-
ingful way to identify what is selected and, above all, how its transmission works. Often
some kind of mechanism which favors the spreading of successful behaviors is employed.
However, many diﬀerent speciﬁcations of this diﬀusion mechanism may be reasonably but
not universally sustained, ranging for instance from popularity-based imitation to ﬁcti-
tious play, from pay-oﬀ based imitation to reinforcement learning. My point is not against
the application of a properly adjusted Darwinian algorithm to economics; I simply ﬁnd
problematic the adoption of biological analogies because it can make people safe in using
a generic evolutionary argument without ﬁne-tuning all the details of transmission. This
conviction about the questionable value of biological analogies is not shared, for instance,
by Hodgson (1997).
3tion, thus justifying the micro-foundation of dynamic social economics. My
argument consists of three steps. First, any explanation of the functioning
of an economy requires some reduction to more primitive elements. Second,
the reduction procedure can in principle be prolonged up to the individual
level. Third, there are reasons of convenience to stop right there.
Let me concentrate on the ﬁrst step. The behavior of a system can in
principle be explained by means of something outside. For instance, tides
can be related to the distance between the earth and the moon and hence
explained outside planet earth. This kind of explanation is however pre-
cluded if the system under analysis is closed, in the sense that it is not
inﬂuenced by anything external to it. My point is that economic systems
can be considered as closed, at least if they are spatially large enough and
they are broadly meant so to include social interactions too. In more detail,
when outer inﬂuences exist an enlargement of the system under analysis
can always be considered. In economic settings many outer inﬂuences can
be internalized by two types of enlargement. First, a spatial or horizontal
enlargement: if two economic phenomena are interrelated, then the com-
position of the two can be analyzed. Second, a social enlargement: since
strict economic behavior is aﬀected by social relations, the latter should be
included in the identiﬁcation of the system to be studied. Of course, some
external explanation is still possible. For instance a natural disaster may ac-
count for a slump in gross domestic product. However, the outer inﬂuences
left over seem to me due to minor or extraordinary causes which cannot be
internalized in any theory.
Drawing conclusions, if the behavior of a system cannot be explained by
anything outside, an explanation must be sought after within its consitu-
tent parts. Since dynamic social economics is interested in macroeconomic
phenomena and considers a wide variety of social interactions, reduction is
by far the main way for doing explanatory theory.
In the second step I argue that the reduction procedure can actually
stop at the individual level. The reasoning is straightforward. The simple
recognition that agents - just now not better speciﬁed individual entities -
are part of socio-economy allows their identiﬁcation within the system un-
der consideration. This obviously counteracts a possible objection against
reduction based on the inexistence of lower-level elements. In addition the
above identiﬁcation allows in principle, according to the common Aristote-
lean rules of logic, a meaningful diﬀerence operation to be taken between
the whole system and agents. The rest of the diﬀerence operation represents
complementary units of explanation and it can be kept rather aggregated
or instead ﬁnely disaggregated, this not being relevant for the current is-
sue.5 Examples of what is left after the break-up of agents are (modeled
5There will be reasons of convenience of other types in favor of particular ways of
disaggregating.
4as) the kinds of relationships among them, public and private endowements
of diﬀerent nature, various types of constraints, outcome functions. From
a certain perspective it can be asserted that what remains after individuals
have been detected is the institutional setup, which translates into the rules
of the game. It is worth noticing that the possibility of this decomposition
does not entail independence between the behaviors of the identiﬁed ele-
ments. In general the evolution of the various components will be linked
together determining an overall dynamics. In any case, it looks as logically
true that agents can be employed as - even if not the unique - elementary
units of explanation.
Finally, I address the third and last step. The ﬁrst step has illustrated
that any explanation of an economic system requires some reduction to its
constituent elements. However, since a reduction procedure can in princi-
ple be iterated many times obtaining more and more elemental units, the
question is where to stop a reductive chain and, consequently, what ele-
ments to choose as units for explanation. The second step has shown that
agents can play this role, and now two reasons are suggested in favor of
this choice. Before entering these motivations I state precisely what is to be
meant by agents quoting one of the most prominent authors in the ﬁeld of
social interactions:
In economic terms, agents are the units who interact with one
another. The notion of an agent embraces persons, ﬁrms, and
other entities such as nonproﬁt organizations and governments.
The essential characteristic of an economic agent is not its phys-
ical form but rather its status as a decisionmaker.6 (Manski,
2000, pp. 118)
The ﬁrst reason in favor of agents as elemental units concerns the im-
plementation of corrective interventions. Once a satisfactory explanation of
an aggregate phenomenon has been provided showing the possibility for an
overall improvement, there emerges the issue of what kind of intervention to
implement. When units of explanation are decision-makers, a rather simple
way to intervene exists since their behavior can be aﬀected by modifying
their incentives. This argument relies on the implicit assumption that in-
dividuals choose actions in order to attain an aim. As I will discuss in the
following, this is strictly related to the concept of rationality.
The second reason concerns the realism of assumptions. Assumptions
are usually made on elemental units of explanation as starting point for
6It might be argued that only persons can be assumed as agents, all other entities
having to be reduced to the persons they are composed of. I prefer to skip this issue and
I conﬁne myself to notice that if the focus is on the status of decision-maker then the
provided deﬁnition holds in any case, since the previous position can simply be rephrased
by stating that ﬁrms and other organizations are not decision-makers.
5deduction. Since economists themselves are individuals, introspection should
represent a valuable channel of information helping them in the formulation
of reasonable assumptions about individuals.7
I conclude this paragraph with a ﬁnal note. I have argued how reduction
to agents as elemental units is possible and useful, in principle. Now I men-
tion a related possible shortcoming and how it can be dealt with. The fact
that something is possible does not mean that it is easy to be accomplished
too. The feature of micro-structure together with that of macro-relevance -
which will be discussed in a following paragraph - makes the reductive chain
extremely long and hence a correct reduction particularly diﬃcult. This is
a practical reason in favor of a shorter reductive chain. However, in my
view it is not enough to give up a micro-foundation because of its numerous
advantages which more than counterbalance this shortcoming. More simply,
the likelihood of reduction mistakes, which may take to neglect signiﬁcant
factors, is an additional reason for including perturbations in the description
of the system - as it will be more extensively treated in the ﬁnal paragraph
of this section.
Limited cognitive capabilities. It is worth discussing the concept of
rationality before addressing the issue of human cognitive capabilities. As it
should be hopefully clearer after reading this paragraph, the issue of ratio-
nality can be analyzed only in a motivational theory of individual behavior.
Therefore agents are given an aim8 and means to attain it. Rationality
means consistency between aim and means from a decision-maker’s point of
view. If to an agent’s knowledge a certain action allows to attain the aim
to a greater extent with respect to another action, then rationality requires
the latter action not to be selected. If no knowledge about the superiority
of either action is at an agent’s disposal, then no choice can be excluded by
virtue of rationality. Notice that agents’ ignorance may derive both from ob-
jective reasons - limited access to information - and from subjective reasons -
limited computational capabilities which imply some cognitive simpliﬁcation
of problems. Suppose now that an agent knows the probability distribution
of outer events whose occurrences determine which action performs better,
she is suﬃciently able in computation, and the aim is further speciﬁed so
to become evaluable in expected terms. In this extreme case rationality re-
quires the selection of the means maximizing in expectation the attainment
of the aim.
7This argument holds to a smaller extent when decision-makers are not individual
persons.
8The introduction of more aims would require some way to compare them, like utility
for consumption bundles. This seems to me very close to deﬁne a unique aim with the
above aims actually instruments for its achievement. Anyway, since these considerations
have nothing to do with rationality and have the only eﬀect to take attention away from
the issue under consideration, I go on with the discussion assuming one aim only.
6Previous considerations show that rationality is a requirement of a class
of models of behavior and does not impose any bound to one’s faculties.
More precisely, a motivational theory of behavior must be rational in order
to be meaningful. In fact, there would be a nonsense in explaining how
people behave in terms of their aims if they were allowed not to try to
pursue their aims. They can fail, but this is another point.
The deﬁnition that I have used deprives rationality from any intrinsic
content reducing it to a matter of form, simply a way of doing theory. The
validity of several statements in this paragraph about rationality clearly
rests on such deﬁnition. Of course other deﬁnitions of rationality can be and
have been used, usually including some requirement about human cognitive
capabilities. However, it seems to me clearer to keep distinct the issue of
consistency of a motivational model from that of the mental powers of its
agents.
As already stated, rationality means motivational consistency from a
decision maker’s point of view. How demanding consistency is in terms of
cognitive capabilities depends on the speciﬁcation of this point of view, that
is on the particular assumptions regarding agents’ knowledge and capabil-
ity in deductive chains. Once all constraints are explicitly speciﬁed then
rationality means nothing but a check that the resulting model is indeed a
motivational theory of behavior. To take this reasoning to its extreme, when
also stupidity is considered as a constraint then a foolish behavior can be
rational.
Therefore, the real issue concerns the type and degree of cognitive ca-
pabilities of human beings, to which I now turn my attention. In short
since there is no surprise in that, agents are endowed with limited cogni-
tive capabilities. Those branches of science regarding human brain, such as
neuroscience, should provide directions for a correct speciﬁcation of these
capabilities. In some simple case agents will know every detail of the prob-
lem they face; for instance in a fair head-or-tails game. More often, given
the complexity of situations agents usually encounter in their everyday life,
their actual knowledge will be very poor if compared with their ignorance.
The following observation prepares the ground to possible critiques. If
an agent does not know which of two actions is better and she is not an
expected utility maximizer (since she is not able to evaluate uncertainty
probabilistically or has some other limitation), then both actions are allowed
as prediction. In general, a unique outcome of the decisional process is not
ensured on the basis of motivational arguments. This may be seen as a
shortcoming, but I do not share such a view. On the contrary, it seems to be
in agreement with common sense that not all human behavior is explainable
by motivations. When two alternatives cannot be evaluated in terms of
their relative convenience, then some second order factor will be relevant
for the decision. Cognitive science, psychology, sociology should help in
determining this drift component. Examples of these factors are imitation,
7anti-conformism, habit.9
It is worth remarking that the theory of individual behavior which is
emerging is motivational - in the sense that no inferior choice can be con-
sciously made - but potentially incomplete. Such incompleteness is solved
according to non-motivational arguments which play the role of tie-break
rules.
Someone may feel vexed by the large variety of possible ways in which
cognitive capabilities ﬁrst and non-motivational factors then can be speciﬁed
in principle. However, directions from other disciplines, as already stated,
should reduce the range of possible speciﬁcations. Moreover, it is anyhow
better to use case-speciﬁc assumptions which represent correctly human rea-
soning in a particular setting than false general ones. Finally, it should be
noticed that the equilibrium reﬁnements literature in game theory has shown
how diﬃcult is to obtain a unique prediction for human behavior under the
assumption of unbounded cognitive capabilities as well, when interactive
decision-making is considered.
Non-market relations. Neoclassical theory of general competitive equi-
librium, which has been the core of mainstream economics for much of the
twentieth century, circumscribed economic analysis to those interactions oc-
curring in markets. The existence of non-market interactions relevant for
economic phenomena was considered as a form of market incompleteness,
and hence as a problem to face for the real world since being a possible
source of ineﬃciency rather than as an aspect to be taken into account for
doing good theory.
Dynamic social economics demands an explicit modeling of the relations
among human beings. This opens to a large variety of diﬀerent structures
of interaction. The spreading of any kind of inﬂuence can in principle be
subordinated to the existence of a certain relation. For instance, trading
oﬀers can be thought of as actually spreading only through purchase/sale
channels, partially linking to each other sellers and buyers of a particular
product.
Furthermore, the abandonment of impersonal markets as unique chan-
nel for human interactions allows an easier treatment of social relations,
many of which cannot reasonably be thought of as occurring in markets.
The recognition of the many interdependencies between social and strictly
economic phenomena is the peculiar contribution of that stream of litera-
ture known as social interactions.10 As a consequence of such a recognition,
the inquiry ﬁeld of dynamic social economics is enlarged in order to include
9It might be sustained the idea that these non-motivational factors are indeed in a
sense instinctively motivational.
10Becker (1974) is the ﬁrst work to my knowledge fully belonging to this research line.
Manski (2000) provides an excellent reﬂection on the state of art of social interactions in
economics.
8social relations. I recall that by so doing an important source of outer in-
ﬂuences is internalized in this emerging theory. Moreover, since dynamic
social economics is based on a non completely motivational theory of indi-
vidual behavior, the room left is mostly ﬁlled by social determinants. In
more detail, the choice among alternatives which a decision-maker is unable
to evaluate in terms of their relative convenience - because of her limited
cognitive capabilities - is driven by many second-order factors of decision
which are essentially of social nature. With a vague pretension to general-
ity, I can refer to conformism or anticonformism (or some average behavior if
the choice is quantiﬁable) with respect to successful or unsuccessful people
(according to some parameter, for instance income) or to one’s neighbors
(from a cultural, racial, spatial, etc. point of view).
Macro-relevance. The aim of dynamic social economics is to understand
how many individual decisions evolve into recognizable patterns of macro-
behavior.
Schelling’s prominent role for my discussion is already known from the
reference to his model of residential segregation in the introduction. Here I
will rely again on Schelling to sustain my point. The subject matter of his
book“Micromotives and Macrobehavior”(Schelling, 1978) - and of dynamic
social economics as well - is, as suggested by the title, that kind of analysis
which
...explores the relation between the behavior characteristics of
the individuals who comprise some social aggregate, and the
characteristics of the aggregate. (Schelling, 1978, pp. 13)
As evidence of the diﬀusion of the feature of macro-relevance in economic
theorizing I quote Blume and Durlauf who, to illustrate the characteristics
of the models typical of social interactions, explain:
The object of a typical exercise using these models is to under-
stand the behavior of a population of economic actors rather
than that of a single agent. (Blume and Durlauf, 2001, pp. 17)
Macro-relevance is no doubt a restriction on the ﬁeld of application for
this approach. However, I would remark how this is a restriction to the
collectivity and as such it is more valuable than other kinds of restriction.
In addition, I recall the role that this aggregate concern plays for the ob-
ject of analysis to be considered as a closed system. Finally, I mention an
additional advantage deriving from the concern on macro-properties. Often
individual behavior can be hardly predictable, since inﬂuenced by many ca-
sual factors not includable in any theory. However, at the aggregate level
some constraints or regularities can emerge and be exploited to get a macro-
description. Relying again on Blume and Durlauf,
9In treating aggregate behavior as a statistical regularity it turns
out that individual behavior need not be as tightly modeled as
it is in traditional economic models. (Blume and Durlauf, 2001,
pp. 18)
The focus on macro-features deriving from the aggregation of many in-
dividual choices suggests a brief digression about the issue of emergentism.
According to a strict deﬁnition an aggregate property is emergent if it is irre-
ducible to lower-level elements. In this sense, it can be emergent a real-world
property with respect to some selected units of explanation, since some other
relevant factor has been disregarded. However, it is impossible that some-
thing actually emerges within a model, every results obviously deriving from
what assumed. Such a deﬁnition of emergentism is therefore inapplicable to
a modeling approach. Suppose now that a model is built up, simulations are
run showing unexpected outcomes, which even after repeated attempts are
not successfully deduced by assumptions. Results still depend on the model-
ing assumptions, but it is not known how. If the requisite of irreducibility in
the deﬁnition of emergentism is meant in a mathematical sense, then emer-
gentism can be used to distinguish between proven (or deductively derived)
and unproven (or inductively derived) aggregate properties. Moreover, if
irreducibility is further speciﬁed so to be meant in a cognitive way, then
also results which are proven but are not of immediate consequence from
assumptions can be labelled as emergent. In my opinion, this last mean-
ing is closest to the spirit of the old-time sentence “the whole is more than
the sum of its parts”. Indeed, sometimes it is the product, meaning that
aggregation can generate non-linearities. Social dynamic economics, as any
potentially non-useless micro-based macro-theory, is emergent according to
this last deﬁnition.
Out-of-equilibrium dynamics. Phenomena under examination by dy-
namic social economics are modeled as dynamic systems. A dynamic rule
is obtained by the composition of all individual decision rules and then it
is applied to the current state of the system in order to get the state at
the next time. Since every decision requires time to be taken and to be
put into eﬀect, this representation is in no case a limitation. However, it is
not useful either unless suﬃciently many applications of the dynamic rule
are considered so for the asymptotic behavior to become relevant. Indeed,
many economic phenomena can be appropriately described as repetitions
of a basic dynamics. In other words, stable forces and relations shaping a
collection of similar individual decision problems can usually be detected as
a consequence of the way human reasoning prevalently works. Facing a deci-
sion problem agents tend in fact to cognitively structure it by simpliﬁcation
and analogy with their past experience.
In all the cases where enough repetitions take place, given the ﬁniteness
10of the state space which is usually assumed, an equilibrium or a cycle (or
an ergodic set in case of a probabilistic setup of the model) is eventually
reached. The evaluation of the state or the set of states to which the system
moves is particularly relevant since once reached the system will stay there
forever, hence justifying its adoption as prediction after that enough time is
elapsed and as long as the model is considered a suitable description for the
situation of interest. Moreover, since many diﬀerent states are mapped into
the same asymptotic behavior, the exact knowledge of the actual state may
be not necessary to predict its long-run behavior. For instance, if it is known
that when a certain behavior is less than 50% frequent in the population it
is going to disappear, then a vague knowledge that such behavior is not
widespread is suﬃcient to conclude about its disappearance.
The above considerations clearly stress the dynamic gist of dynamic so-
cial economics, as well as the role played by equilibria and other types of
long-run behavior. Indeed, they are important as the lasting outcomes of a
dynamic process. As a rule of thumb, their prominence may be measured
by the relative largeness of their basins of attraction. Finally, it is worth
remarking the importance of the precise knowledge of trajectories, since
that allows prediction by connecting transient states with their ﬁnal future
projections.
Markov properties, mathematical deduction and simulations. This
paragraph discusses Markov chains with the aim to point out how they are
the natural representation when the previously analyzed principles are ob-
served. This particular perspective from which Markov chains are looked
at determines the inclusion of this paragragh within this section about pre-
analytical features and a consequent informal style of presentation. A more
formal treatment follows in the next section.
It has previously been remarked the importance for predictive purposes
of the mapping of many transient states into the same asymptotic behav-
ior. However, the greater the dependence of asymptotic behavior on initial
conditions is, the more diﬃcult prediction becomes, since it requires a more
precise knowledge of the current state. Here the notion of stochastically
stable distribution comes to assistance, proving to be a fundamenatal tool
for the selection of a unique prediction. Consider a system whose current
state univocally determines the probability with which the next period each
possible state is reached. Such a process is a Markov chain. A deterministic
dynamics can be represented as a special case by setting 1 to the probability
of a certain transition and 0 to all other probabilities. The key insight here
is that the addition of random perturbations aﬀecting individual decision-
making yields an irreducible and aperiodic chain.11 In fact, that allows the
11The conditions under which a Markov chain is said irreducible and aperiodic are stated
precisely in the next section.
11application of a well-known result by which the system converges in the long
run to a certain probability distribution - called unique invariant distribution
- irrespectively of the initial condition. Unfortunately, in order to compute
that unique prediction all transition probabilities are to be exactly speciﬁed
and a system made of a probably enormous number of equations is to be
solved. This possible empasse is overcome by the existence of i) the limit of
the invariant distribution for the amount of perturbation going to zero and
ii) relatively simple ways to get at least its support. Such limit distribution
is called stochastically stable distribution.12
It is worth stressing how this analytical technique represents a rather
general tool to make predictions. A very large variety of processes may be
formalized so to be ﬁnite Markov chains under very weak conditions, which
I now discuss. The ﬁrst condition requires time to be discrete and states
to be ﬁnite. In support of that, universe is probably ﬁnite according to the
prevailing opinion in physics. Moreover, world population is surely ﬁnite
and, because of human limited cognitive capabilities, agents would simplify
in any case the decision problem they face so to get a ﬁnite representation of
the alternatives among which to choose. Finally, the type of decisions agents
take usually deﬁnes a time-unit in a natural way. Therefore this requirement
does not look like a particularly demanding one, continuity instead probably
being an approximation of reality used for analytical convenience.
The second condition, often called Markov property, requires the possi-
bility to neglect any information about the past except the state of the sys-
tem at the last time for predicting the state of the system at the next time.
However, since states can be redeﬁned so to be ﬁnite sequences of states,
this condition actually amounts to the system having a ﬁnite memory. Be-
cause the system consists of agents with ﬁnite memory as a consequence of
their limited cognitive capabilities, this second requirement should be safely
accepted too.
Finally, the last and slightly more controversial condition requires time
homogeneity, that is insigniﬁcance of time for predicting the future once the
state at the last time is taken into account. In other words, what is here
demanded is the constancy over time of the forces at play, so that being in a
certain state at distinct times makes no diﬀerence for transition probabilities.
If ﬁnite Markov chains are accepted as representations, then what really
matters in order to use the stochastically stable distribution is the existence
of perturbations and the way they aﬀect the system. Perturbations, more
than as a technical device, appear in this framework as a conceptual requi-
site. A ﬁrst reason for that actually applies to any theory, and especially
to rough ones, as for the present theories of human behavior. In a model
12Applications of the stochastically stable distribution to economic issues are progres-
sively spreading. For instance, in Young (1993b) the evolution of bargaining norms is
extensively considered while in Young and Burke (2001) a reasonable explanation of the
pattern of cropsharing contracts found in contemporary U.S. agriculture is provided.
12the eﬀects of a set of hypotheses are investigated and the usefulness of that
rests on the possibility to extend drawn conclusions to real world situations.
The presence of perturbations somehow checks the robustness of results with
respect to shaking assumptions, therefore allowing a less problematic appli-
cation of such results to reality.
The importance of perturbations is even greater in the framework of
dynamic social economics for further reasons. As discussed in a previous
paragraph about micro-structure, since analysis starts from micro-behavior
to conclude about macro-properties, the explanatory chain is very long and
hence many relevant elements are likely to be left out of the model or mis-
represented. Moreover, individual decision rules are obtained by a particular
speciﬁcation of human cognitive capabilities and social inﬂuences. So doing
there is no claim about general validity and no point in investigating the
consequences of precisely that speciﬁcation. In other words, there may be
some sense in assuming exactly an extreme case in the space of cognitive
capabilities, as standard models with highly-gifted agents do, since this is
just a way to choose the relevant dimension. However, when the relevant
dimensions have been chosen there is much less sense in assuming a very
particular combination of them - an exact inner point surrounded by similar
points - as models with humanly-gifted agents would do.
Perturbations of individual behavior have noteworthy implications on the
concept of rationality. In a previous paragraph a behavior has been deﬁned
as rational if it is not in contrast with perceived convenience. The intro-
duction of perturbations brings irrationality in this framewrok; sometimes
people choose something they regard as inferior. This apparent discrepancy
with the claimed motivational foundations of this theory of behavior disap-
pears once it is taken into consideration that perturbations are inserted in a
very small amount and, moreover, that they can be justiﬁed by the existence
of some neglected motivation.
The existence of perturbations is however not enough. They ensure that
people can make any choice, but what is indeed required is that any state
must be reachable from any other state. This condition is called ergodicity
and, given perturbations of individual behavior, it substantially amounts to
the inexistence of irreversible processes.
Finally, there is a last and more subtle requirement for the application
of the stochastically stable distribution, namely the correctness of the limit
operation. My point is very simple. Since pertubations are not only a tool
for selection but they ﬁnd justiﬁcation for their existence according to pre-
vious arguments, then particular care should be put in the limit operation.
Some occurrences in the model may be extremely unlikely, so implying a
very small probability for the transition from certain states to other states.
This probability, however small it is, is bound to be much greater than the
probability of a perturbation to occur, since the limit for the latter going to
zero is computed to get the stochastically stable distribution. This is what
13necessarily occurs even when in our intuition the probabilities of a certain
unlikely event and of a perturbation are comparable. Therefore, the choice
to use this limiting technique for prediction imposes as limitation the task
to represent extremely unlikely occurrences as impossible.
As extensively discussed, the stochastically stable distribution is by far
the main instrument for deriving results from a set of assumptions in mod-
els of dynamic social economics. Other mathematical techniques for dy-
namic systems can also be used for contingent cases. However, systems
composed of many interacting agents updating behavior by personal infor-
mation often turn out to be intractable by any mathematical tool. At times
known results can be applied in order to identify at least the support of
the stochastically stable distribution. At other times that is not possible,
the only available method remaining induction from data generated by com-
puter simulations.13 Moreover, simulations can help in identifying what is
to be proven hence simplifying its formal demonstration.
Economics distinguishes from other social sciences for the rigor of anal-
ysis. This, which is a merit in itself, has brought about a snobbish attitude
towards methods of analysis without formal proofs, including simulations.
However, since economics is an applied discipline it seems to me natural to
consider much better a good model where results are inferred by simulation
than a model fully and elegantly characterized by theorems but scarcely
applicable to reality.
The following quotation by some of the leading authors in agent-based
modeling is a marvellous synthesis of the role of simulation in doing theory.
Simulation in general, and [agent-based modeling] in particu-
lar, is a third way of doing science in addition to deduction
and induction. Scientists use deduction to derive theorems from
assumptions, and induction to ﬁnd patterns in empirical data.
Simulation, like deduction, starts with a set of explicit assump-
tions. But unlike deduction, simulation does not prove theorems
with generality. Instead, simulation generates data suitable for
analysis by induction. Nevertheless, unlike typical induction, the
simulated data come from a rigorously speciﬁed set of assump-
tions regarding an actual or proposed system of interest rather
than direct measurements of the real world. (Axelrod and Tes-
fatsion, 2005, pp. 2)
After asserting the important role of this alternative tool of analysis,
it is necessary to underline how having recourse to simulations should be
13As evidence of the increasing adoption of simulation techniques in economics - and
of their complementary role with respect to the analytical derivation of the stochastically
stable distribution - it is worth noticing how results in the already cited Young and Burke
(2001) are complemented by computer simulations.
14subordinated to mathematical deduction. A ﬁrst reason is obviously the
certainty of results deriving from proofs with respect to inductively drawn
conclusions. However, since simulations allow enormous data sets and a full
control on assumptions, this argument is not so strong as it could appear
at a ﬁrst glance. A second and more important reason concerns the deeper
understanding of a model resulting from deduction. When hypotheses are
worked out by means of chains of reasoning and results are eventually got,
the dependence of the latter from the former is dissected.14 Any conceiv-
able model is a drastic simpliﬁcation of reality. The choice of the more
appropriate simpliﬁcation is made easier by the grasp of the role played by
assumptions, which can thus be evaluated functionally with respect to the
real-world case under consideration.
3 Perturbed Markov Chains
Given the prominence of perturbed Markov chains as tool for representation
and analysis, a brief theoretical survey is provided here.
Elements of Markov chain theory. I ﬁrst introduce some basic deﬁni-
tions and ﬁndings about standard Markov chains before speciﬁcally address-
ing perturbed chains.
Deﬁnition 1 (Markov chain). A Markov chain in discrete time on a ﬁnite
space is a couple (S,T) such that:
1. S is a ﬁnite set called state space;
2. T is a transition matrix on S, that is 0 ≤ Ts1s2 ≤ 1 for any s1,s2 ∈ S
and
P
s2 Ts1s2 = 1 for any s1 ∈ S.
The state space S is the set of all possible descriptions of the system
under consideration. Every description - or state - speciﬁes any detail which
is relevant for the determination of the state the system will visit at the
next time. For instance, a state can simply indicate the number of agents
using each available action. However, if agents were heterogeneous under
some signiﬁcant characteristic, then the identity of the agents selecting every
action would also be relevant and hence should be included in the description
too. Again, if agents had remembrance of their previous actions and used
somehow that remembrance for taking decisions, then past actions should be
also part of a state. In brief, a lower bound to the largeness of the state space
is imposed by the requisite for the dynamics to be Markovian on that state
space, while an upper bound is usually established by aiming at simplicity,
so disregarding any aspect which does not aﬀect transition probabilities.
14This argument is stronger for constructive demonstrations and justiﬁes their privileged
use in economics.
15The transition matrix T states the probability of moving from any given
state in S to every state in S in the next period. Since every state is a
complete description of all relevant aspects, then agents’ decision problems
are always properly deﬁned. Given a speciﬁcation of human cognitive ca-
pabilities and of non-motivational factors of choice, a behavioral rule turns
out to be deﬁned. The choices of all agents, applied to the current state of
the system, determine the probability with which each state is reached at
the next time.
Consider now the following notion of accessibility. A state s2 is acces-
sible from a state s1 when there exists a non-negative integer r such that
Tr
s1s2 > 0. Accessibility is a preorder since reﬂexive (T0
ss = 1 for any s)
and transitive (Tr1
s1s2 > 0 and Tr2
s2s3 > 0 ⇒ Tr1+r2
s1s3 ≥ Tr1
s1s2Tr2
s2s3 > 0). A
preorder can be used to classify and partially order the elements of a set.
The resultant equivalence classes are called communication classes. Maxi-
mal communication classes - those from which no other classes are accessible
- are called ergodic sets (or absorbing sets or recurrent sets). Equivalently,
a nonempty set of states is ergodic if it is a minimal set with respect to the
property of being closed under dynamics T. States which do not belong to
an ergodic set are called transient. The notion of basin of attraction has been
used by the reference literature in two diﬀerent ways which I ﬁnd convenient
to distinguish from one other. The basin of weak attraction of an ergodic
set comprises all those states from which that ergodic set is accessible. The
basin of strong attraction of an ergodic set comprises all those states from
which that ergodic set is the unique accessible ergodic set. Notice that i-a)
basins of weak attraction may intersect if the dynamics is not deterministic
and ii-a) their union covers S entirely while i-b) basins of strong attraction
never intersect and ii-b) their union may not cover S entirely if the dynamics
is not deterministic.
A Markov chain (S,T) is said to be irreducible if S is the unique ergodic
set. Let Rs be the set containing all those positive integers r such that
there is a positive probability of moving from s to s in exactly r periods,
Rs ≡ {r > 0 : Tr
ss > 0}. A Markov chain (S,T) is said to be aperiodic if for
every state s the greatest common divisor of the elements of Rs is unity.
A probability distribution over S is a vector z collecting the probabilities
to be in every state. The application of transition probabilities T to the
current probability distribution zt yields the probability distribution at the
next time, ztT = zt+1. A vector z satisfying the condition zT = z is called
invariant or stationary distribution for intuitively obvious reasons. The
following propositions are standard results about the asymptotic behavior
of Markov chains.
Proposition 1. If (S,T) has a unique ergodic set, then:
1. there exists a unique invariant distribution ˆ z;
162. the relative frequencies with which states occur converges almost surely
as time goes to inﬁnity to ˆ z, independently of the initial state.
Proposition 2. If (S,T) is irreducible and aperiodic then for any s ∈ S
the probability to be in s at time r converges as time goes to inﬁnity to ˆ z,
independently of the initial state.
Therefore the unique invariant distribution of any irreducible and aperi-
odic Markov chain can be interpreted both as the proportion of time spent
in each state and as the probability of being exactly in each state, when time
is suﬃciently great. Moreover, this holds independently of the initial state.
Proposition 3 is due to Freidlin and Wentzell (1984) and provides a
way to calculate the invariant distribution for irreducible Markov chains.
Its main importance stems however from being the fundamental tool for
deriving proposition 4. A couple of deﬁnitions prepare the ground.
Deﬁnition 2 (Rooted tree). Let X be a ﬁnite set and x ∈ X. An x-tree Fx
on X is a collection of ordered pairs of elements of X, Fx ⊆ X × X, such
that:
1. For every x1 ∈ X, x1 6= x, there exists a unique x2 ∈ X such that
(x1,x2) ∈ Fx.
2. There is no x1 ∈ X such that (x,x1) ∈ Fx.
3. For every x1 ∈ X, x1 6= x, there exists a sequence x1,x2,x3,...,xk,x
of elements of X such that (x1,x2) ∈ Fx, (x2,x3) ∈ Fx, ..., (xk,x) ∈
Fx.
Deﬁnition 3 (Likelihood of a rooted tree). Let (S,T) be a Markov chain.





Let Fs indicate the set of all s-trees on S. Proposition 3 establishes that
the probability ˆ zs of each state s is proportional to the sum of the likelihoods
of all its s-trees.











17The addition of perturbations. Some noise is introduced in the form
of a small amount of probability for agents to choose disregarding their
behavioral rule. For a comment on the role of perturbations see the last
paragraph of the previous section. Here just notice that such an introduction
easily yields an irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain for any positive
amount of noise.
Deﬁnition 4 (Perturbed Markov chain). A perturbed Markov chain15 in
discrete time on a ﬁnite space is a triple (S,T,T()) such that:
1. S is a ﬁnite state space;
2. T is a transition matrix on S;
3. T() is a family of transition matrices on S indexed by  ∈ [0,¯ ) such
that:
(a) (S,T()) is irreducible for each  ∈ (0,¯ );
(b) T() is continuous in  with T(0) = T;
(c) there exists a function r : S × S → R+ ∪ {∞} such that for all




r(s1,s2) exists and is strictly positive if r(s1,s2) < ∞
Ts1s2() = 0 for suﬃciently small  if r(s1,s2) = ∞
Function r is usually called resistance or cost.
For any  > 0 the system converges to its unique invariant distribution
ˆ z() solution of z = zT(). Since the presence of perturbations ﬁnds a pre-
analytical justiﬁcation, the ideal description of the long run behavior of the
system would require the computation of ˆ z(). However, that distribution
is usually too diﬃcult to be derived, even when proposition 3 is exploited.
Therefore, it looks reasonable to use the limit for a vanishing amount of noise
- if existing and easier to compute - as an approximation of the invariant
distribution when perturbations are very rare.
Let E be the set of all the ergodic sets of the unperturbed Markov chain
(S,T). The concept of rooted trees is now applied to set E, with FE in-
dicating the set of all E-trees on E. The notion of resistance (or cost) is
extended to ergodic sets, letting r(E1,E2) indicate the minimum sum of the
resistances between states over any path starting in E1 and ending in E2,
with E1 and E2 two distinct ergodic sets. Deﬁnition 5 provides a suitable
potential function to be used in the following proposition 4 due to Kandori
et al. (1993) and Young (1993a), which is the central result of this section.
15I call perturbed Markov chains what are regular perturbed Markov chains in Young’s
terminology (Young, 1998).
18Deﬁnition 5 (Stochastic potential). Let (S,T,T()) be a perturbed Mar-







Proposition 4 (Stochastically stable distribution). Let (S,T,T()) be a
perturbed Markov chain, with ˆ z() the unique invariant distribution for any
positive . Then:
1. lim→0 ˆ z() ≡ ˜ z exists and is unique;
2. ˜ z is an invariant distribution of (S,T);
3. ˜ zs > 0 ⇐⇒ s ∈ E : E ∈ argminE γ(E).
The limit distribution ˜ z is usually called stochastically stable distribu-
tion and those states to which a positive probability is assigned are called
stochastically stable states.
Proposition 4 establishes that the stochastically stable states are those
easiest to reach from other states, with easiest interpreted as requiring the
fewest mutations, that being measured by the stochastic potential.
The stochastically stable distribution provides a description of the very
long run behavior of the system. One of the main limitations for its adoption
as tool for prediction derives from the diﬃculties in quantifying how long is
the waiting time for the stochastically stable distribution to become relevant.
Proposition 5, due to Ellison (2000), deals with this issue establishing a
bound to the expected waiting time until a stochastically stable state is
reached for the ﬁrst time. In addition, it provides a suﬃcient condition
for identifying stochastically stable states. Some deﬁnitions are required in
order to simplify the following expostion.
Let Ω be the union of one or more ergodic sets of the unperturbed Markov
chain (S,T). Expanding a previously deﬁned notion to unions of ergodic
sets, let the basin of strong attraction of Ω be the set of states from which
accessible ergodic sets belong uniquely to Ω, and indicate it with D(Ω). A
path p from a set X ⊆ S to a set Y ⊆ S is a sequence of states (s1,s2,...,sk)
such that s1 ∈ X and sk ∈ Y . Denote with P(X,Y ) the set of all paths
from X to Y . In a perturbed Markov chain the resistance of a path p =
(s1,s2,...,sk) is r(p) =
Pk−1
i=1 r(si,si+1).
Deﬁnition 6. Let (S,T,T()) be a perturbed Markov chain.


















i=2 R(Ei) and E1,E2,...,Er such that Ei 6= Ei+1
for i = 1,...,r−1 the sequence of ergodic sets visited along the path p.
Denote with W(s,Ω,) the expected wait until a state belonging to Ω is
ﬁrst reached given s as initial state. The notation f(x) = O(g(x)) as x → 0
is a shorthand for there exist ¯ x > 0 and c such that |f(x)| < c|g(x)| for any
x ∈ (0, ¯ x).
Proposition 5. Let (S,T,T()) be a perturbed Markov chain and Ω a union
of ergodic sets such that R(Ω) > CR∗(Ω). Then:
1. the set of stochastically stable states is contained in Ω;
2. for any s / ∈ Ω, W(s,Ω,) = O(−CR∗(Ω)) as  → 0.
4 Conclusions
With reference to some recent developments in economics, sampled by the
articles collected in “Social Dynamics”, Durlauf and Young write:
When this body of work is assessed as a whole, we do not think it
is an exaggeration to say that a new social economics paradigm
has begun to emerge. (Durlauf and Young, 2001, preface)
There is a widespread agreement that something new is arising and de-
termining fundamental changes in economics. However, what exactly is
emerging is a more controversial argument. The ﬁrst aim of this paper has
been to outline in perspective this new research direction, aware of the dif-
ﬁculties due to the ongoing state of research and hence having recourse to
speculation, and to promote the change towards the identifed core of prin-
ciples.
The identifying features for this new approach to economic theorizing -
which I have labelled dynamic social economics - are listed and extensively
discussed. What turns out is a theory looking at macro-properties of a
perturbed dynamic system generated by a micro-structure of agents socially
interconnected and endowed with limited cognitive capabilities. This seems
to me a very natural way for examining in abstract terms the working of a
20social system. Indeed, it seems so natural to let me wonder why it has not
gained a leading role in social sciences yet. I suspect a couple of reasons to
have played an important role for hindering its diﬀusion.
First, the fact that agents are (or are referable to) human beings - even if
helpful for formulating reasonable hypotheses - is a delicate point at risk of
ideological inﬂuences. In more detail, accepting the possibility that individ-
uals make systematic mistakes can (or can be thought to) partly deligitimate
individual freedom. As a consequence, extremely high requisites have been
imposed on human cognitive capabilities. This has in turn made decision
problems very complicated hence requiring representative simpliﬁcations to
get solutions, with the result that social relations have been ignored and
economic relations mediated through impersonal markets.
The second reason concerns technical unmanageability. Society is a com-
plex phenomenon and an appropriate representation of it - like, in my opin-
ion, the one discussed in this paper - is likely to turn out too complex to be
of any help. However, recent developments in analytical and computational
techniques have been progressively overcoming technical diﬃculties, so mak-
ing the suggested representation fruitful. I refer in particular to that kind
of mathematical deduction represented by the stochastically stable distribu-
tion, and to computer simulations in an important complementary position.
The second aim of the paper has been to survey those mathematical
techniques promising to become standard tools in this ﬁeld. I pursued this
objective ﬁrst by introducing some basic elements of Markov chain theory
and then by dealing with perturbed Markov chains, yielded through the
addition of perturbations. The main results regarding the stochastically
stable distribution (Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993a; Ellison, 2000) are
presented and brieﬂy discussed.
The next step in agenda for dynamic social economics is the setup of ap-
plied models for speciﬁc issues.16 On one side this will reveal how useful this
modeling technique can actually be. On the other side an important feed-
back can be obtained showing where theoretical or technical improvements
are necessary.
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